Abstract-In this work, we study the safety approach of synthesizing resilient supervisors against actuator attacks, for cyber-physical systems that can be modeled as discrete-event systems. A constraint based approach for the bounded synthesis of resilient supervisors is developed. The supervisor obfuscation problem, which is proposed in a specific setting of actuator attack, can be naturally modelled and solved using the same approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The safety of cyber-physical systems (CPS) against adversarial attacks has recently drawn much research interest from both the discrete-event systems and formal methods community [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . For a recent survey and position paper on the discrete-event systems based approach, the reader is referred to [13] . In this paper, we consider discrete-event systems (DES) as our model of CPS and consider an approach for the safety enforcement of CPS under attacks. In particular, we further study the safety approach of synthesizing resilient supervisors against actuator attacks, mostly following the framework of [11] , [12] .
We assume there exists an adversarial attacker that can corrupt a subset of events sent from the supervisor to the actuators (i.e., compromised controllable events). The attacker's goal is to cause damages on the attacked closed-loop systems. Any supervisor that can guard against the damages caused by attackers is said to be resilient. In this work, we shall address the problem of resilient supervisor synthesis against actuator enablement and disablement attacks. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We provide a generalized formulation of actuator attack. Compared with [11] , [12] , we allow general control constraints on the supervisors and general attack constraints on the attackers.
• We model each actuator attacker as a Moore automaton and propose a new composition operator to construct the attacked closed-loop system, for any given plant, supervisor and actuator attacker.
• We generalize the supervisor obfuscation problem and formulate the resilient supervisor synthesis problem with a range-control target [14] .
• We provide a constraint based approach for the bounded synthesis of resilient supervisors against actuator attacks.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shall introduce some basic notations and terminologies used in automata theory [15] , [16] , [17] and (quantified) Boolean formulas [18] .
For any set A, we shall use |A| to denote its cardinality. For any two sets A and B, we use A × B to denote their Cartesian product and use A − B to denote their set difference.
A (partial) finite state automaton G over alphabet Σ is a 5-tuple (Q, Σ, δ , q 0 , Q m ), where Q is the finite set of states, δ : Q × Σ −→ Q the partial transition function 1 , q 0 ∈ Q the initial state and Q m ⊆ Q the set of marked states. G is said to be a complete finite state automaton if δ is a total function. Let L(G) and L m (G) denote the closed-behavior and the markedbehavior of G, respectively [15] . When Q m = Q, we also write G = (Q, Σ, δ , q 0 ) for simplicity, in which case we have L m (G) = L(G). G is said to be n-bounded if |Q| ≤ n. For any two finite state automata G 1 = (Q 1 , Σ 1 , δ 1 , q 1,0 , Q 1,m ), G 2 = (Q 2 , Σ 2 , δ 2 , q 2,0 , Q 2,m ), we write G := G 1 G 2 to denote their synchronous product. Then, G = (Q := Q 1 × Q 2 , Σ :
, where the (partial) transition function δ is defined as follows: for any q = (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ Q and any 2 σ ∈ Σ,
, where Q is the finite set of states, Σ the input alphabet, δ : Q× Σ −→ Q the (partial) transition function, q 0 ∈ Q the initial state, Q m ⊆ Q the subset of marked states, T the output alphabet and η : Q −→ T the output function. Whenever Q = Q m , we shall omit the Q m component. G is said to be complete if δ is complete. Propositional formulas (or, Boolean formulas) [18] are constructed from (Boolean) variables by using logical connectives (∧, ∨, ⇒, ¬). The truth value of a propositional formula φ is determined by the variables' truth values. A literal l is either a variable x i or its negation ¬x i . A clause c is a disjunction l 1 ∨ . . . ∨ l n of literals. A (propositional) formula in conjunctive normal form (CNF) is a conjunction of clauses. Each propositional formula can be transformed into an equivalent formula in conjunctive normal form. Let Var(φ ) denote the set of all the variables that occurr in φ ; A model of φ is a mapping M : Var(φ ) → {0, 1} (0 representing False, 1 representing True) such that φ is evaluated to be True if all the variables x i in φ are substituted by M(x i ). A propositional formula φ is said to be satisfiable if it has a model M. The Boolean Satisfiability Problem (abbreviated as SAT) is the problem of determining if a given propositional formula is satisfiable. Quantified Boolean formulas are an extension of Boolean formulas where each variable can be quantified either universally or existentially. The Quantified Boolean Formula Problem (abbreviated as QBF) is the problem of determining if a totally quantified Boolean formula is True or False.
III. MAIN IDEA
The problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors against adversarial attacks can be formulated as an ∃∀ second order synthesis problem. The main idea is explained as follows. Let G denote the plant under control. In synthesizing resilient supervisors, we essentially ask for the existence of a supervisor S in the supervisor space S such that, for any attacker A in the attacker space A , the attacked closed-loop system •(A, S, G) satisfies a desired safety property Φ sa f e , if some assumption Φ assume holds, where • is the composition operator determined according to a chosen semantics of the attacker and its effect on the closed-loop system. Then, the resilient supervisor synthesis problem is reduced to a constructive proof or refutation of the following ∃∀ second order logic formula:
Different variations of the resilient supervisor synthesis problem can be expressed, depending on the choice of supervisor space, attacker space and properties Φ assume and Φ sa f e .
For the supervisor space, one can impose restrictions on the set Σ c of controllable events, the set Σ o of observable events and the state size of the supervisors, in addition to some prior property that needs to be guaranteed by the supervisors on the closed-loop systems (in the absence of attacker). For example, one may be required to synthesize a resilient supervisor S of state size 3 no more than 10 6 that controls (at most) events a, b, observes (at most) events a, c and ensures S G |= Φ prior , where Φ prior denotes some prior safety (and progress) property that needs to be satisfied by S G. By requiring L(S G) = K with Φ prior , the above synthesis formula can be used to model the supervisor obfuscation problem [12] .
For the attacker space, one can impose restrictions on observation and attack capability of the attacker. For example, the attacker space A may consist of all the actuator attackers that are able to observe events a, b, c and attack event a. The attacker may even combine sensor and actuator attacks [3] , [11] .
In general, it is also possible to consider distributed supervisors (respectively, distributed attackers) over given control architectures (respectively, attack architectures) as the supervisor space (respectively, the attacker space).
Φ sa f e can specify the state avoidance property (i.e., the avoidance of certain states in the plant) or more general safety property [11] . In [3] and [11] , the attackers are assumed to be covert. That is, the attacker needs to remain covert in the course of attacking the closed-loop systems until damages are inflicted upon the attacked closed-loop systems. Since the covertness of an attacker is with respect to the supervisor and plant, one can examine the covertness of an attacker by using the attacked closed-loop system •(A, S, G). It is convenient to express covertness by using Φ assume (instead of defining it in the attacker space), and we shall adopt this approach in this paper. Thus, to synthesize a resilient supervisor against covert attackers, we let Φ assume = Φ covert . On the other hand, if we let Φ assume = True, then the covertness requirement is removed and each synthesized resilient supervisor, if any, needs to guard against the damages caused by risky attacks [11] .
Instead of tackling the unbounded formulation directly, we can start with a bounded formulation of the synthesis problem:
where S n denotes the space of supervisors of state sizes no more than n and A m the space of attackers of state sizes no more than m. To solve the bounded supervisor synthesis problem, we focus on an approach that reduces the above ∃∀ second order synthesis problem to solving the QBF problem, as carried out in [19] , [20] , [21] in a different context. The basic idea proceeds as follows.
Since both S and A are of bounded state sizes, we can encode each of them using a list of Boolean variables. Now, if the (finite state) verification problem •(A, S, G) |= (Φ assume ⇒ Φ sa f ety ) can also be propositionally encoded, e.g., using some (quantified) Boolean formula φ assume sa f e , then the above bounded supervisor synthesis problem is effectively reduced to proving the validity of the quantified Boolean formula ∃X, ∀Y, φ assume sa f e , where X denotes a list of Boolean variables that encodes supervisor S and Y encodes attacker A. We can then use a QBF solver (or a repeated calls of SAT solver [20] ), for example, to solve ∃X, ∀Y, φ assume sa f e and extract a certificate from its proof that can be used to construct the supervisor S of state size no more than n, if the formula is true. If the formula is false, then we can increase the value of n and repeat the solving process. If there exists a supervisor S of state size no more than n that is resilient against all attackers of state sizes no more than m, then there is still the trouble that S is not guaranteed to be resilient against all the attackers. If 4 there is available an oracle O for solving the attacker synthesis problem
then we can check the resilience of S against all attackers. If S is not resilient against all attackers, say there is a successful attacker of size m ′ > m, then we can solve the bounded synthesis problem with supervisor space S n and attacker space A m ′ . If indeed there is a resilient supervisor, then it can be synthesized using the above procedure.
If there is no oracle O for solving the attacker synthesis problem, then the best possibility for us is to synthesize a supervisor that is resilient against all attackers up to a large state size. It is possible that the synthesized supervisor is indeed resilient, but there is no proof unless the oracle O becomes available.
IV. SYSTEM SETUP AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. System Setup
To instantiate the idea in Section III, in the remaining of this work, we focus on the problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors against actuator attacks. To that end, we first introduce and present a formalization of the system components.
Supervisor: A control constraint over Σ is a tuple C = (Σ c , Σ o ) of sub-alphabets of Σ, where Σ o ⊆ Σ denotes the subset of observable events and Σ c ⊆ Σ denotes the subset of controllable events. Let Σ uo = Σ − Σ o ⊆ Σ denote the subset of unobservable events and let Σ uc = Σ − Σ c ⊆ Σ denote the subset of uncontrollable events. In the absence of attacker, a supervisor over control constraint (Σ c , Σ o ) is modeled by a finite state automaton S = (X, Σ, ζ , x 0 ) that satisfies the controllability and observability constraints [23] :
• (controllability) for any state x ∈ X and any uncontrollable event σ ∈ Σ uc , ζ (x, σ )!, • (observability) for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event σ ∈ Σ uo , ζ (x, σ )! implies ζ (x, σ ) = x, The control command generated at each supervisor state x ∈ X is simply Γ(x) := {σ ∈ Σ | ζ (x, σ )!}. When and only when the supervisor fires an observable transition ζ (x, σ ) = x ′ satisfying 5 Γ(x) = Γ(x ′ ), it sends the newly generated control command Γ(x ′ ) to the plant. In the degenerate case when the system first initiates, the supervisor sends the initial control command Γ(x 0 ) to the plant.
Plant: The plant is modeled as a finite state automaton G = (Q, Σ, δ , q 0 ) as usual. Whenever the plant fires an observable transition δ (q, σ ) = q ′ , it sends the observable event σ to the supervisor.
Attacker: The attacker can exercise actuator attacks. We assume the attacker knows the models of plant G and supervisor S to allow the possibility of making informed attack decisions 6 . We shall impose some restrictions on the capability of the attacker as follows. Let Σ o,A ⊆ Σ denote the subset of (plant) events that can be observed by the attacker. In addition, we assume the attacker can fully observe each control command sent from the supervisor to the plant. Let Σ c,A ⊆ Σ c denote the subset of controllable events that can be compromised under actuator attack. That is, the attacker can modify the control command γ issued by the supervisor on the subset Σ c,A . We shall henceforth refer to A = (Σ o,A , Σ c,A ) as an attack constraint. An attacker over attack constraint A is modeled as a complete Moore automaton
} is the output alphabet and η : Y −→ T is the output function. Intuitively, Σ a denotes the observation alphabet of the attacker, each of which is a tuple that consists of 1) observation of event execution from the plant and 2) control command sent from the supervisor. Σ a drives the state transition of the attacker. The output function η assigns to each state y ∈ Y the attack decisionη(y) ∈ T , specifying the actuator attack η(y). Intuitively, the attacker determines at state y the set of enabled compromised controllable events to be η(y). For each σ ∈ Σ a , we write σ = (σ [1] , σ [2] ).
Attacked Closed-loop System: In the presence of an attacker, we assume the supervisor is augmented with a monitoring mechanism for the detection of attack. Recall that, in the absence of attack, a supervisor is given as S = (X, Σ, ζ , x 0 ) that satisfies the controllability and observability constraints. Now, let S T = (X ∪ {x halt }, Σ, ζ T , x 0 ) be the transformed supervisor, where x halt / ∈ X is a distinguished halt state and ζ T is obtained from ζ by adding,
• for each state x ∈ X and each σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ o , the transition
The first item of the transformation is used for detecting the presence of an attack. If an unexpected observable transition is observed by the supervisor, then the supervisor can immediately infer the presence of an attacker and halts the execution 7 by running into the halt state x halt , which has no outgoing transition. The second item of the transformation allows the occurrence of each compromised controllable event that is unobservable to the supervisor, which leads to self loop. Overall, both items ensure that each compromised controllable event is treated as uncontrollable by the supervisor; accordingly, each σ ∈ Σ c,A is defined at each supervisor state of S T after the transformation. We here shall remark that control commands are generated using S (and thus ζ ), which is the supervisor under normal operation, instead of S T ; there are two exceptional cases that are not modeled in S (due to attack occurrence).
• At any supervisor state x ∈ X and for any σ ∈ Σ c,A − Σ o , if ¬ζ (x, σ )! and an enablement attack on σ occurs, we shall assume Γ(ζ (x, σ )) = Γ(x), despite of the fact that ζ (x, σ ) is undefined. This is because the occurrence of σ (due to attack) is unobservable to the supervisor.
• At any supervisor state x ∈ X and for any σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩ Σ o , if ¬ζ (x, σ )! and an enablement attack on σ occurs, we shall assume Γ(ζ (x, σ )) = Γ(x). Indeed, upon the occurrence of an unexpected observable event σ (due to attack), the supervisor has run into the halt state and halted the execution of the closed-loop system. The choice of Γ(ζ (x, σ )) does not matter and is chosen to be Γ(x) in the definition for technical convenience. Based on plant G, supervisor S (or transformed supervisor S T ) and attacker A, we can construct the attacked closed-loop system •(A, S, G).
The definition of θ is as follows: for any (y, x, q) ∈ Z and any σ ∈ Σ,
2) θ is undefined for any other case We shall provide an explanation about the definition of θ . We only need to consider the case when x = x halt , as otherwise there will be no transition defined at (y, x, q) ∈ Z. If σ ∈ Σ c,A , then there is an outgoing transition at (y, x, q) labeled by σ only if σ ∈ C(y) , i.e., σ is enabled by the attacker at state y. If σ / ∈ Σ c,A , then there is an outgoing transition at (y, x, q) labeled by σ only if ζ (x, σ )!, i.e., σ is enabled by the supervisor at state x (in this case, we have ζ T (x, σ ) = ζ (x, σ )). The transition, due to the execution of σ , for S and G shall be straightforward; the transition for A depends on 1) its observation P o,A (σ ) [11] on σ and 2) the control command sent from the supervisor at state ζ (x, σ ), if any. There are four cases. The attacker observes σ , if σ ∈ Σ o,A , and observes 8 
Successful Attacker: To specify in a general manner what strings can cause damages, in this work we use a complete finite state automaton H = (W, Σ, χ, w 0 ,W m ) [11] to facilitate the expression of the property ¬Φ sa f e (cf. Section III). Intuitively, Φ sa f e states 9 that "each string s ∈ L m (H) cannot be generated in the attacked closed-loop system" [11] . In the special case of state avoidance property, we can get rid of H and introduce the set Q bad ⊆ Q of bad states to avoid in the plant G. Without loss of generality, we make the assumption that each w ∈ W m is a sink state, i.e., ∀σ ∈ Σ, w ∈ W m , χ(w, σ ) = w. Intuitively, this means that damage is never recoverable. Furthermore, we can assume |W m | = 1, i.e., there is only one sink state, without loss of generality. Let H = (W, Σ, χ, w 0 , {w m }) in the rest.
To track the executions of the attacked closed-loop system w.r.t. H, we synchronize •(A, S, G) with H using synchronous product operation to obtain
2) µ is undefined for any other case Then, Φ sa f e is translated to "no state in I m is reachable from i 0 ". Now, let us look at the assumption Φ assume . For covertness attack, intuitively Φ assume = Φ covert requires that if the attacker is ever caught, then it must have already caused damages. Φ assume is translated to "no state in {(y, x halt , q, w) | w = w m } is reachable from i 0 ". Thus, a covert attacker's goal is "no state in {(y, x halt , q, w) | w = w m } is reachable from i 0 and some state in I m is reachable from i 0 ", i.e., Φ assume ∧ ¬Φ sa f e ; a risky attacker's goal is "some state in I m is reachable from i 0 ". An attacker is successful if its goal is achieved.
B. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we recall two problems, i.e., the supervisor obfuscation problem [12] and a formulation of the resilient supervisor synthesis problem [11] .
there is no successful attacker on (G, S) w.r.t. A and H. 2) Resilient Supervisor Synthesis: Given a plant G over Σ,
) and a damage automaton H over Σ, compute a supervisor S w.r.t.
and 2) there is no successful attacker on (G, S) w.r.t. A and H?
. Thus, the supervisor obfuscation problem is a special case of the resilient supervisor synthesis problem formulated above, by setting L(G 1 ) = L(G 2 ) = L(S ′ G). In the rest of this work, we address the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis problem, i.e., bounded formulation of Problem 2.
V. BOUNDED RESILIENT SUPERVISOR SYNTHESIS
Recall that the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis problem amounts to solving the ∃∀ second order logic formula:
for a large values of n and m. If there is an (respectively, no) oracle for solving the attacker synthesis problem, then it is possible to synthesize a resilient supervisor with (respectively, without) proof (cf. Section III)
To solve the problem, we let Φ assume = True. In this case, a synthesized supervisor S, if it exists, is resilient against all risky attackers of state sizes no more than m. A risky attacker still uses the models of the plant, supervisor and its online observations to make informed attack decisions; in the ambiguous situation where an attack may cause damages or get caught without causing damages, a risky attacker will carry out the attack. Thus, a covert attacker is much conservative than a risky attacker. Correspondingly, the synthesized supervisor S is also resilient against all covert attackers of state sizes no more than m. An advantage for using this heuristic is that, by setting Φ assume = True, we remove a lot of difficult constraints associated with ¬Φ assume . This may allow us to generate a bounded resilient supervisor much faster.
We shall now generalize the technique of [24] and provide a polynomial-time reduction from the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis problem with Φ assume = True (bounded formulation of Problem 2 for risky attackers) to the QSAT problem. In the high level, the idea of the reduction proceeds as follows: for any given bounded instance of Problem 2 with plant G, damage automaton H, specification automata G 1 , G 2 , control constraint C and attack constraint A , we produce a QBF formula Φ
is true iff there exists an n-bounded supervisor S that is resilient against all m-bounded risky attackers w.r.t. H and A and
. Moreover, we can extract a certificate from its proof that can be used to construct an n-bounded supervisor S that is resilient against all risky attackers of state sizes no more than m and satisfy Φ prior , if the formula is true.
Let S = (X, Σ, ζ , x 0 ) be an n-bounded finite state supervisor over C = (Σ c , Σ o ), where X := {x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 } consists of n states, x 0 ∈ X is the initial state; the partial transition function ζ : X × Σ −→ X is the only parameter that needs to be determined to ensure that S is a solution of the given instance, if a solution exists. We need to use complete finite state automata for tracking synchronous products. Thus, S cannot be directly used. To properly model the halt state x halt for handling attack, it turns out that we need to work with the tuple (S T , {l x,σ | x ∈ X, σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩ Σ uo }) instead, where S T = (X ∪ {x halt }, Σ, ζ T , x 0 ) is the transformed supervisor, S T denotes the completion of S T and each l x,σ is a Boolean variable that is true iff there exists a loop at state x labeled by σ in S (i.e., unobservable event σ is enabled at supervisor state x). Formally, the completion of any partial finite state automaton P = (U, Σ, π, u 0 ) is a complete finite state automaton P = (U ∪ {u d }, Σ, π, u 0 ,U), where the distinguished state
We remark that it is straightforward to obtain S T and the truth values of l x,σ from S; on the other hand, to obtain S from S T , we need to remove all the transitions associated with x halt , x d , and remove the self-loop labeled with σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ uo if the value of l x,σ is false, for each x ∈ X and each σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ uo . Thus, we only need to focus on (S T , {l x,σ | x ∈ X, σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩ Σ uo }).
We know that S T is given by the 5-tuple
and we need to determine ζ T to determine S T . We know that ζ T (x d , σ ) = x d and ζ T (x halt , σ ) = x d , for any σ ∈ Σ. For convenience, we let x n = x halt and x n+1 = x d . We introduce Boolean variables t S T x i ,σ ,x j , where x i , x j ∈ X ∪ {x n , x n+1 }, and σ ∈ Σ, in the encoding of S T with the interpretation that t S T x i ,σ ,x j is true if and only if ζ T (x i , σ ) = x j . We encode the fact that ζ T is a transition function using the following constraints.
for each σ ∈ Σ Then, let φ S T , f sa n denote the resultant formula after combining Constraints (1), (2), (3) and (4).
With the above constraints, we can now encode the fact that S is a finite state supervisor over C = (Σ c , Σ o ) and S T is a (properly) transformed supervisor using the following extra constraints.
In particular, Constraints (5) are imposed to ensure controllability and Constraints (6) ensure observability of S. We shall note that the range of the index j in (5) and (6) does not contain n, n + 1. Constraints (6) are only applied for σ ∈ Σ uo ∩ Σ c,A . For each σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩ Σ uo , we know that
. This is captured in Constraints (7). Constraints (8) intuitively mean that there cannot be transitions labeled by σ / ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ o from x i to x n , for each i ∈ [0, n − 1]. Constraints (7) are (8) ensure that S T is a (properly) transformed supervisor. Then, let φ S T ,con obs n denote the resultant formula after combining Constraints (5), (6) , (7) and (8) .
Let φ S T n = φ S T , f sa n ∧ φ S T ,con obs n . The constraint φ S T n guarantees that S is a n-bounded finite state supervisor over C . Now, we need to introduce Boolean variables to encode the attacker as well. Let
be an m-bounded attacker over A = (Σ o,A , Σ c,A ) , where Y = {y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y m−1 } consists of m states, y 0 ∈ Y is the initial state, T = {t ⊆ Σ | t ⊆ Σ c,A } is the output alphabet; the partial transition function β : Y × Σ a −→ Y and the output function η : Y −→ T both need to be determined to specify the attacker A. We introduce Boolean variables t A y i ,σ ,y j , for each y i , y j ∈ Y , σ ∈ Σ a , and introduce Boolean variables e A y i ,σ , for each y i ∈ Y , σ ∈ Σ c,A . Intuitively, t A y i ,σ ,y j is true iff β (y i , σ ) = y j and e A y i ,σ is true iff σ ∈ η(y i ).
Now, we need to encode the fact that the attacker A is a complete finite state automaton over Σ a . This can be ensured with the following constraints, 9) ¬t
denote the formula that combines Constraints (9) and (10) . Now, after the supervisor S and the attacker A has been propositionally encoded, we need to encode propositionally the following two constraints:
, q d respectively. We need to track the synchronous product S G G 1 to ensure that for any reachable state, if G 1 is in the marked state, then S G has to be also in the marked state. We also need to track the synchronous product S G G 2 to ensure that for any reachable state, if S G is in the marked state, then G 2 has to be also in the marked state. Instead of S, we shall work with S T to be consistent in formulating constraints. Intuitively, both x n and x n+1 are now treated as dump states in this case. We remark that it is now necessary to use the Boolean variables l x,σ , where x ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ uo , instead of t S T x,σ ,x for tracking Σ c,A ∩ Σ uo loops in S. In fact, it is possible that l x,σ is false but t S T x,σ ,x is always true due to attack (cf. Constraint 7)).
For S T G G 1 , we now introduce 10 , as in [24] , auxiliary Boolean variables r x,q.q 1 , where x ∈ X ∪ {x n , x n+1 }, q ∈ Q ∪ (x 0 , q 0 , q 1,0 ) in S T G G 1 , then r x,q,q 1 is true. We have the following constraints.
In particular, Constraints (12), (13) and (14) are used to propagate the constraints on r x,q,q 1 , based on the synchronous product construction and the inductive definition of reachability. We just need to note that special attention must be paid to each σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩ Σ uo transition, and we need to use l x,σ instead on each state x ∈ X = {x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 }. Based on Constraints (12), (13) and (14), Constraints (15) are used to ensure L(G 1 ) ⊆ L(S G). Let φ S T le f t denote the resultant formula after combining Constraints (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) .
For S T G G 2 , similarly, we introduce auxiliary Boolean variables r x,q.q 2 , where x ∈ X ∪ {x n , x n+1 }, q ∈ Q ∪ {q d } and q 2 ∈ Q 2 ∪ {q 2,d }, with the interpretation that if state (x, q, q 2 ) is reachable from the initial state (x 0 , q 0 , q 2,0 ) in S T G G 2 , then r x,q,q 2 is true. We have the following constraints.
In particular, Constraints (17), (18) and (19) are used to propagate the constraints on r x,q,q 2 , based on the synchronous product construction and the inductive definition of reachability. Based on Constraints (17), (18) and (19) , Constraints (20) are used to ensure L(S G) ⊆ L(G 2 ). Let φ S T right denote the resultant formula after combining Constraints (16) , (17), (18), (19) and (20) .
Finally, we need to encode the safety property Φ sa f e , which states that "no state in I m = {(y, x, q, w) ∈ I | w = w m } is reachable from i 0 in automaton O = •(A, S, G) H". We need to work with S T and G instead, in formulating the constraints. We now introduce auxiliary Boolean variables r y,x.q,w , where y ∈ Y, x ∈ X ∪ {x n , x n+1 }, q ∈ Q ∪ {q d } and w ∈ W , with the interpretation that if state (y, x, q, w) is reachable from the initial state (y 0 , x 0 , q 0 , w 0 ) in •(A, S T , G) H, then r y,x,q,w is true. For each
In particular, we know that t S T x i ,σ ,x j is a faithful 11 encoding of the transition ζ (x i , σ ) = x j of S, for any σ ∈ Σ o ∪ (Σ − Σ c,A ) and i, j ∈ [0, n − 1]. For each σ ∈ Σ c,A ∩Σ uo and each x i ∈ X, we define ω(
For each x i ∈ X and each σ ∈ Σ o , we define
We only need to be concerned with the case when σ ∈ Σ o , since no control command will be sent when σ ∈ Σ uo is fired. For any x ∈ X and any control command γ ∈ Γ, we introduce the formula ψ(x, γ) :
We have the following constraints, which involve many case analysis.
In particular, Constraints (22) are used for the case
Constraints (23) are used for the case
Constraints (24) are used for the case
Constraints (25) are used for the case σ / ∈ Σ c,A ∧ ζ (x i , σ )! and σ / ∈ Σ o,A ∧ Γ(x i ) = Γ(ζ (x i , σ ))
Constraints (22), (23), (24) and (25) is true, we can extract a certificate from its proof and obtain the assignments of Boolean variables in X, which can be used to construct a resilient n-bounded supervisor S against all attackers of state sizes no more than m (both cover and non-covert attackers) and satisfy L(G 1 ) ⊆ L(S G) ⊆ L(G 2 ), as we have discussed before (first construct S T , then construct S). In the case of restricting to normal supervisors (i.e., Σ c ⊆ Σ o ) and normal attackers (i.e., Σ c,A ⊆ Σ o,A ) with the additional restriction that Σ o,A ⊆ Σ o [11] , we can run the oracle O in [11] for attacker synthesis problem for verifying the resilience of a supervisor against all covert attackers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper presents a preliminary study on the problem of synthesizing bounded resilient supervisors against actuator attacks, including both enablement and disablement attacks. There are many research works that can be carried out to extend this work. An immediate problem of interest is the attacker synthesis problem for a general setup, where an oracle is planned to be developed. The symbolic encoding technique used in this work can be improved and we plan to extend the bounded synthesis supervisor approach to attack scenarios with both actuator and sensor attacks.
